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Abstract
Security focused regulations have been largely exempt from the benefit-cost type 
of analysis required for major Federal regulations and done routinely in areas such 
as transportation, environment and safety.  Among the reasons offered for 
exemption are the analytical difficulties of security issues involving complex or 
poorly understood probabilities and consequences.  This paper investigates the 
magnitude of security focused regulations, a framework for developing an 
expected costs analysis of regulations, and the current “break-even” analysis used 
by the Department of Homeland Security.   Key assumptions implicit in the 
current analysis are identified and suggestions are made for the difficult evolution 
of security regulations toward a more explicit benefit-cost analysis.
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Security  investments  and  regulation  focused  on  anti-terrorism  have 
increased  dramatically  since  the  attacks  of  September  11,  2001.    This  is 
particularly  true  for  federal  regulations  where  security  quickly  earned  an 
importance similar to environmental protection, food safety and transportation.  
When federal regulations expanded rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, it prompted a 
reaction from opposing forces that included the adoption of benefit-cost analysis 
as a means of assessing regulations and assisting in the centralized control of laws 
based on agency regulations (McGarity 1993).   In the current era, security rules 
create unique  challenges  for benefit-cost  analyses.   While  there  are numerous 
problems in calculating the costs of these regulations, the primary challenges are 
in measuring the benefits and associated probabilities of security rules.  Since 
much of the information required to assess the value of preventing terrorist attacks 
is not only highly uncertain but also classified, rules on security have generally 
escaped serious economic analysis.  Although many of these rules are issued by 
components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), some are issued by 
other agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of 
Agriculture.
Minimal components for the benefit-cost analysis of a homeland security 
regulation are: benefits using estimates of costs avoided; probabilities; and costs 
to industry, citizens and government to implement a regulation.  However, there is 
no established template or model for applying benefit-cost analysis to homeland 
security issues where the probabilities, and to a lesser extent the avoided costs, are 
poorly understood.  Standard benefit-cost texts do not cover the topic   A search 
of the economics literature using the words terror, homeland, benefit and cost in 
various combinations results in a total of 19 cites of which most were tangential to 
actually applying benefit-cost analysis to security issues.  
Some benefit-cost issues are discussed at a macro level, as in Enders and 
Sandler (2006) that discusses a balancing based on a target’s expected value and 
ease  of  protection.    A  few  others  focus  on  individual  actions  including  self-
protection, insurance, and value of homes and consider the usefulness of response 
to risk from natural disasters as a model for security expenditures (Smith and 
Hallstron 2005; Lakdawalla and Zanuani 2004).  Finally, a few authors consider 
the homeland security allocation problem of an organization such as DHS from 
which  some  benefit-cost  implications  can  emerge  (Farrow  2007;  Bier,  et  al. 
2008).    More  of  the  literature  focuses  on  case  studies  relating  to  individual 
components of a benefit-cost analysis of security regulations.
In response  to  these  issues,  this  paper investigates  a particular type of 
analysis,  break-even  analysis,  used  by  DHS  for  several  homeland  security 
regulations and summarizes a benefit-cost framework for investing in security that is designed to be consistent with benefit-cost guidance from the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB 1992, 2003).  The review of DHS’ analysis and 
the  conceptual  framework  is  then  used  to  suggest  further  steps  in  the  use  of 
benefit-cost analysis to security regulations.
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Central  issues  surrounding  analysis  of 
homeland  security  costs  and  benefits  are  described  in  Section  II.    Section  III 
presents the DHS break-even analysis and the conceptual framework mentioned 
above.  In Section IV, the recent DHS analyses are critiqued using the conceptual 
framework.    Section  V  offers  recommendations  for  improving  security  based 
benefit-cost analyses and related conclusions.
II. Costs, Consequences and Probabilities
Every  year,  the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  (OMB)  reports  to 
Congress on the annual benefits and costs of regulations. In the area of homeland 
security, OMB says "Because the benefits of homeland security regulation are a 
function of the likelihood and severity of a hypothetical future terrorist attack, 
they  are  very  difficult  to  forecast,  quantify,  and  monetize."  (OMB  2008). 
However  OMB  does  keep  track  of  the  implementation  costs  of  a  subset  of 
homeland security regulations.   This subset consists of those regulations that are 
"economically significant" under Executive Order 12866. These regulations each 
have an impact on the economy of more than $100 million in at least one calendar 
year. Since 2002, there have been fourteen such regulations. Most of these have 
been issued by components of DHS but several have been issued by the Food and 
Drug  Administration  (FDA)  to  prevent  bioterrorist  attacks.  These  fourteen 
regulations  have  been  estimated  to  "impose  a  total  cost  on  the  economy  of 
between $3.4 billion to $6.9 billion a year." (OMB 2008). 
There are two reasons that this number is likely to be an understatement. 
One reason is that OMB does not include all regulations in its estimate. The other 
reason  is  omissions  in  the  calculations  of  the  costs  of  individual  regulations.  
There  have  been  far  more  than  fourteen  rules  issued  since  2002  that  impact 
homeland  security.  OMB  has  never  estimated  the  cost  of  rules  not  deemed 
"economically significant" but has stated that the rules included in their totals, 
"economically  significant"  rules,  likely make  up  the  bulk  of  regulatory  costs. 
However, Robert Hahn, in an examination of an EPA rule, has noted that even 
economically insignificant rules can have significant costs (Hahn 2006). Forty-
nine other final security rules have been promulgated by agencies between 2002 
and 2008 in addition to the 10 economically significant
1.  Many of these rules are 
                                                
1 A list of these rules appears in Appendix 1 from the Unified Agenda.  The Unified Agenda is 
published semiannually and contains agency descriptions of all of the regulations they plan on 
issuing over the next six months and all those that they have issued in the previous six months.not counted because the promulgating agency estimates that they cost less than 
$100 million per year.
2  Even if each of these rules only cost $25 million/year, 
their inclusion would add another billion dollars to the costs.  And there is good 
reason to think that for these rules in particular the costs may be large (perhaps 
even greater than the $100 million/year threshold). 
Of those rules with costs estimated as less than $100 million/year, many 
make it more difficult for immigrants to enter the United States. Since there is no 
analysis on rules with costs below $100 million/year, it is impossible to ascertain 
whether the agency considered the broader effect on the economy of immigration 
rules even if the direct effect on immigrants is excluded because they are not U.S. 
citizens. Such rules may have large effects on sectors such as agriculture, which 
employ large numbers of immigrants. These indirect costs likely are much greater 
than the direct costs that agencies usually estimate in cost benefit analyses. While 
they may not make the cost of any of these rules rise above $100 million, it is also 
unlikely that the rules have trivial costs
3.  
Many homeland security rules also restrict individual liberties and privacy. 
While the rules may mention these costs, there is no attempt to quantify them. In 
fairness to DHS, the academic literature has only touched on this issue. Viscusi 
and Zeckhauser (2003) have analyzed the tradeoff between civil liberties and the 
prevention  of  terrorism  and  noted  that  people  are  willing  to  trade  off  some 
liberties and convenience for increased safety. However, such costs certainly exist 
and  their  absence  from  the  analyses  justifying  homeland  security  regulations 
means that the estimated costs are certainly lower than the true costs. 
.
Benefits and risks for assessing regulation
A necessary element of a benefit-cost analysis is the determination of the 
benefits.  For safety type regulations, the typical framework is that benefits are 
primarily  generated  by  expected  costs  avoided  as  a  result  of  the  regulation.  
Expected costs avoided include elements of both probability (sometimes referred 
to as risk) and consequences.  Delving deeper, changes in probability are typically 
associated  with  prevention  measures  and  changes  in  consequence  (conditional 
cost) are associated with mitigation measures.  The complexity of each of these 
elements,  probability  and  consequence,  is  limited  “only”  by  the  analysts 
                                                
2 Technically the rules should be counted if the benefits exceed $100 million in any given year as 
well but since benefits are never counted it is likely that some rules that should be in the OMB 
total are not included.
3 An entire literature exists on the costs and benefits of immigration to the United States (see for 
example Borjas 2005). This literature is far too complex to discuss here but it is quite likely that 
measures to restrict immigration have important economic impacts.imagination  and  analytical  tools.    For  instance,  discussions  of  resiliency  as  a 
characteristic of a system  (Rose Oladosu and Liao 2007, Sheffi 2005) can be 
viewed as the challenge to modeling how various expenditure alternatives affect 
the costs avoided.  If a system is resilient the cost avoided may be large with 
respect to several different types of attack or types of hazards.  
An  anchoring  point  for  avoided  cost  is  the  economic  cost  of  the  9/11 
attacks for which various estimates exist.  The DHS uses a mean figure of $375 
billion for damages from the 9/11 attacks on New York and the airline system 
(DHS 2007a). Other studies, such as that by the GAO (2002) isolate the effect on 
New York city and state.  The Congressional Budget Office concludes that the 
macroeconomic effects were slight (CBO 2002).  
Table I Costs of Various Terrorist Attacks
Author Attack Cost Estimate
Gordon et. al. Aviation system $ 214 to 421 billion (not counting lives)
Rose, Oladosu,
 Liao
L.A. blackout $ 2.8 to 20.5 billion, depending on resilience (defined 
by the author as ability to respond to the attack)
Rosoff and 
Winterfeldt
Dirty Bomb in 
LA/Long Beach 
ports
$ 130 million to $ 100 billion, depending on 
length of shutdown.  (Assumes zero lives lost.) 
Gordon et. al. LA, Long Beach 
ports
from $1.1 billion (or 10,061 person-years of 
employment) to $34 billion (or 212,000 person-years 
of employment)
Park Dirty bomb in 
LA/Long Beach 
ports
$34 billion in import/export losses.  No estimate 




Power plant attack in DC $1.18 billion
Abt Bioterrorist 
attack




Seattle highways from $1.2 to $1.5 billion
The  terrorist  attacks  spurred  substantial  work  on  the  potential  costs  of 
various types of terrorist attacks in the United States such as: bioterrism (Abt 
2005),  targeted  on  the  Washington,  DC  area  (Cheng,  Stough,  and  Kocornik-
Minaand 2006) Seattle (Bae, Blaine, and Basso 2005), the ports of Los Angeles 
and Long Beach (Gordon et. al. 2005), on the aviation system (Gordon et. al. 
2007), and on the power system for Los Angeles (Rose, Oladosu, and Liao 2007).
The above scenarios and their associated cost estimates appear in Table 1.  
The costs are total costs, not annual costs.  Where the articles include sensitivity analyses for various scenarios, the value cited  as the central estimate or most 
likely estimate is used in the table  for illustrative purposes.  More generally, the 
Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) has developed HAZUS 
(FEMA  2009)  a  nationwide  inventory  and  model  of  the  built  environment, 
geographic  features,  and  population  to  predict  damages  from  natural  disasters 
such as floods and wind.  The model can also be adapted to assess damages from 
security related events. 
Estimating probabilities in security based benefit-cost analysis
The many issues involved in estimating the costs avoided, the benefits, 
become  even  more  complex  when  determining the  probability of  an  attack  at 
various sites and of various types.  At times implicitly, cost estimates such as 
those above involve assumptions about attack mode and severity given that an 
attack occurs.  For instance, a private company, "Risk Management Solutions," 
has developed a model for insurance companies to use to measure the risk of 
terrorist  attacks.    DHS  has  also  used  this  model  to  generate  probabilities  for 
various attacks; these can, in turn, be fed into a benefit-cost analysis.  The model 
is available for private purchase but does not appear to have been subject to peer 
review; additionally, the assumptions underlying it are not obvious to the outside 
researcher.
4
Other  approaches  use  a  single  step  to  consider  probability  and 
consequence.   Likelihood and consequence are frequently mentioned as a risk 
based approach to security issues.  Sheffi (2005) among others has a diagram 
similar to Figure 1 below  where analysts are encouraged to place potential events 
in a subjective location in the two dimensional diagram based on probability and 
consequence.  The apparently simple diagram is based on being able to normalize 
all  events  along  a  fixed  continuum  on  the  horizontal  axis  and  a  personally 
subjective measure of utility that combines the probability and consequence pair
5.  
The diagram illustrates five possible events, with arbitrary divisions between high 
and low. The diagram illustrates that some action may move event 2 from the 
upper right quadrant, high probability and high consequence, to the upper left 
quadrant with somewhat lower probability and significantly lower consequence.  
                                                
4 See http://www.rms.com/Terrorism/Solutions/ProbabilisticTerrorismModel.asp. Accessed: 2008-
07-15. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5ZL0ak9mv).
5 An explicit third dimension is missing from Figure 1, namely some function of probability and 
consequence.  The whole theory of utility and risk may be invoked so that the missing function 
depends on the preferences of each individual decision-maker.Figure 1:  Example of risk matrix
Adapted from Alexander and Marshall (2006)
In contrast, Figure 2 is based on computing the missing third dimension as 
probability times damage, the expected value, which is a common anchoring point 
for evaluating risks (OMB 2002).  The level curves show values of equal expected 
damage.  While both diagrams agree that the upper right-hand corner is of high 
risk (also high expected value), the scaling in Figure 2 depends on the case at 
hand and may seem to dip more toward major disasters than does the standard box 
diagram of Figure 1.   
Does populating Figure 2 with approximate information on specific risks, 
probability  and  consequence  pairs,  constitute  a  benefit  cost  analysis?    No.  
Information potentially presented in Figure 2 is the initial “exposure” of the level 
of expected cost.  Information for benefit-cost analysis focuses on the change in 
the expected benefit (avoided cost) as a result of an action, say the expenditure of 
homeland security funds or the requirement of private expenditures resulting from 
regulation.  The reduction in expected cost, the benefits, can be caused by either a 
change in probability or a change in consequences given that an event occurs.  
This is equivalent to the movement of risk number 2 in Figure 1. Further, the
implementation  cost  of  an  alternative  is  not  represented  in  Figure  2.    The 
analytical  tasks  to  rank  utility  and  bound  consequences  appear  barely  less 
stringent than the tasks for a benefit-cost analysis.   
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2Figure 2:  Contours of equal expected cost (P*C):  
          Probability (0 to 1) and Damages (0 to 100 Billion)
However, beyond standard issues of estimating or eliciting probabilities, 
homeland security appears to involve a greater degree of uncertainty about such 
estimates  making  “level  curves”  as  in  Figure  2  more  like  vague  bands.   
Weitzman (2007) in studies of climate change discusses how such uncertainties 
can swamp concerns about the timing of events.  Although there is no agreed 
upon  approach,  Posner  (2004)  discusses  some  methodologies.    While  Posner 
focuses  on  cases  of  catastrophic  risks,  some  of  his  suggestions,  most  notably 
"inverse cost-benefit analysis,"  are potentially applicable  to  homeland security 
questions. Posner’s approach asks how large the (unknown) probability would 
have to be in order to equate benefits and costs.   Several authors have suggested 
that it may be possible to develop threshold probabilities for action as a residual, 
to which rules of reason, external information, or consistency may be brought to 
bear.  Fundamentally however, the available data are unlikely to provide “bright 
lines”  that  divide  action  from  inaction.    In three  recent  regulations,  DHS  has 
utilizes this inverse benefit-cost analysis, renaming it “break-even analysis.”   
III. Using benefit-cost analysis to assess homeland security regulations
Into this paucity of empirically relevant benefit-cost models, DHS funded 
research led to published work on the benefits and costs of security expenditures 
by LaTourette and Willis (2007, 2008) that focused on developing an empirically 
applicable type of break-even analysis to link a minimum measure of risk (defined 
more precisely below) with a break-even level of benefits and costs.  Their model 
is summarized here in order to contrast and compare its simplifying assumptions 
















                     CONSEQUENCEleads to suggestions for caution in interpreting current break-even estimates of 
security regulations and identifies areas for improvement.   
LaTourette  and  Willis  (2008)  define  their  break-even  benefit-cost 
estimator using a baseline and a new annualized loss (Lb or n) reflecting what might 
occur without and with the regulation.  They identify the change (reduction) in 
losses as the benefit, the annualized regulatory costs, I,
6 as the cost, and state that 
a benefit-cost test requires Lb-Ln  >  I.  By dividing each side the by the baseline 
loss and using an equality, they define the break-even minimum “Risk” (R) to just 
equal the cost:
                                    R= (Lb-Ln)/Lb = I/Lb                              (1)
When  DHS  is  able  to  estimate  the  cost  of  the  regulation,  I,  and  the 
baseline loss, Lb, then equation 2 can be used to estimate the break even level of 
risk  necessary  for  the  benefits  to  just  equal  the  costs.      In  several  homeland 
security regulations, DHS has used variations on this approach to investigate this 
risk as a function of the baseline level of loss, Lb and other factors.  Clearly the 
larger the baseline loss in the absence of a regulation, the smaller is the breakeven 
R (risk) necessary to justify the regulation.
While this breakeven analysis is a step forward in synthesizing quantitative 
benefit  and  cost  information  to  inform  decisionmaking,  there  are  assumptions 
implicit  in  the  measure  as  written,  and  in  comparison  to  models  that  include 
concerns such as the ability of attackers to shift targets, symbolic targets, and 
other concerns.  
Understanding the assumptions implicit in the breakeven analysis begins 
with recognizing that the measure R refers to a change in losses that is not known 
with certainty in advance.  Guidance on regulatory analysis (OMB, A-4, A-94) 
recommends the use of expected values.  Define a simplified expected value
7 as 
P*C, the probability times a consequence, that is here defined as L in equation 1 .  
After substitution, the equation becomes: PbCb - PnCn >  I .  Some of the difficulty 
in the interpretation of R as a probability is investigated by considering three 
cases  (after  changing the  inequality  to  equality  in  order  to  find the  minimum 
change to determine a break-even amount).  
Case  1:  The  regulation  is  probability  reducing  and  doesn’t  change  the 
consequence so that Cb=Cn=C, then Pb-Pn = I/C.  If DHS uses its regulatory cost 
estimate, I, and the dollar valued consequence of an attack, C, to estimate R, then 
                                                
6 This assumes that there is reliable information on the value of I.  See the discussion above for 
problems with official estimates of the costs of homeland security regulations.
7 This is simplified as the expected value is normally defined as the integral or sum of 
probabilities times consequences.  Here the case is simplified to one outcome.  In the case of many 
outcomes, each of the probabilities or consequences are assumed to be affected equally.the estimate is the required change in probability to break-even, not a percentage 
change.  This is one interpretation used in DHS regulations.
Case 2:  The regulation is consequence reducing only and doesn’t change the 
probability  so  that  Pb=Pn=P,  then  P=I/(Cb-Cn).    If  DHS  uses  the  change  in 
consequence, C, with and without the regulation, then the right hand side yields 
an estimate of the probability of attack necessary to equate the benefits and costs.
Case 3:  When both probability and consequence change due to the regulation, 
one might divide Equation 3 by the base expected value, then (PbCb-PnCn )/ PbCb
= I/PbCb .  If DHS has data on the cost of the regulation, I, and the initial expected 
loss of an attack, Pb*Cb, then the result is an estimate of the proportional change 
in  risk  and  appeared  to  be  used  in  some  DHS  regulations.    However,  the 
denominator  in  the  right  hand  side  is  the  expected  value,  which  presumes 
estimation  of  probabilities,  the  lack  of  which  was  the  initial  motivation  for  a 
simpler approach. 
 While the above indicates some complications in interpreting exactly what 
DHS estimates in its regulations, a set of expected value models presented in 
Farrow (2007) illustrates additional concerns as below.   
A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis: Expected cost minimization models
Guidance from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB, 1992, 
2003) defines expected value estimates as the foundational analysis, which may 
be extended by simulation approaches or methods that incorporate more complex 
aspects of decision-making under uncertainty.  Farrow (2007) used an expected 
value, social cost minimization framework in a series of benefit-cost structured 
models  to  provide  guidance  on  defining  benefit  and  costs  and  in  allocating 
security  expenditures.    Social  cost  minimization,  by  including  costs  avoided 
through security investments, is a benefit-cost framing of the problem.  Implicit in 
the recommendations for optimal allocation of security expenditures is that the 
benefits exceed the costs until the recommended allocation is achieved, at which 
time the benefits just equal the costs, breaking even, if the model is correct.   
Although  based  on  the  decomposition  of  risk  into  its  probability  and 
consequence  components  as  in  the  above  section,  each  of  the  social  cost-
minimization models is more complex than that of LaTourette and Willis, because 
a constraint on  the amount  of expenditures  on  homeland security is  assumed.  
Such a constraint on expenditures would seem to better capture the real problem 
of  government  investment  than  assuming  an  unlimited  amount  of  funds  is 
available.    Table  II  summarizes  benefit-cost  criteria  and  data  as  increasingly 
complex  issues  are  considered,  such  as  a  constraint  on  the  total  expenditures 
available for security investments or that improving security at one location may 
increase the probability of attack at another.Consider the situation where security expenditures at a particular target 
may encourage terrorists to switch to another target.  Lakdwalla (2003) and Woo 
(2003) both point out that homeland security rules can be thought of as falling 
into two categories that are designed to prevent either a specific or a general type 
of attack.  Examples of rules in the specific category include FDA rules designed 
to  protect  the  food  supply
8  and  Transportation  Security Administration  (TSA) 
rules designed to protect air travel.  General rules that are designed to make it 
harder for terrorists to conduct any type of attack.  Rules that make it harder to 
enter the United States are in this category.
Table II:  Benefit-cost models and criteria adapted from Farrow (2007)
Issue/model Recommended Action and Break-
even result   
Key  Variables  Required  for 
Estimation
1. Allocating a Fixed 
Expenditure Amount 
among  Independent 
Sites
Equate the marginal expected social 
costs avoided (MESCA) 
Social costs avoided and their 
change with expenditures, 
probabilities, and costs of 
implementation
2. Displacement of 
Probability of Attack   
Determine the net MESCA, net of 
probability increasing effects at 
other sites 
As above plus adjustments in 
probability for diverted attacks
3. Constraint on 
Probability or Cost 
Reduction
Results in an optimal inequality 
among sites even where investment 
occurs
As above but break-even will 
be different at sites with 
constraints
4. Both Prevention and 
Mitigation Reducing 
Activities
Equate the marginal social cost 
avoided of each type of expenditure  
As above but also separates 
effect of each activity
5. General rules: Public 
Goods
Invest until the sum of  marginal 
damages avoided equals the 
individual site MESCA
As above but identify the 
multiple sites that are 
positively   linked.
6. All Hazards:  Multiple 
Sources of Probability 
and Cost
The form of decision is the same 
(e.g. equate MESCA), but all costs 
and probabilities taken into account
As above but more complex 
probabilities
7. Dynamic Uncertainty 
and Irreversibility 
There can be an optimal 
‘‘overinvestment’’ in safety  
More complex uncertainties
For  the  first  category  of  rules  or  "specific  security  rules,"  one  likely 
assumes  that  rational  terrorists  will  alter  their  behavior  in  the  wake  of  new 
restrictions.  Model 2 in Table II captures this complication.  Therefore the net 
benefit for a specific security rule should be the differential or net value between 
                                                
8 See for example, Federal Register 69 FR 71561.the benefit of preventing the specific attack (or reducing its likelihood) and the 
cost of a "replacement level" attack (the type of attack that a terrorist would turn 
to if their first choice attack was made too difficult).  In some cases where attacks 
are particularly deadly, the differential benefits between the specific attack and 
the replacement attack may be significant.  Protecting nuclear facilities or large 
chemical plants may very well fall into this category.  
On the other hand, "general security rules," designed to make it harder for 
terrorists to enter this country, or to make it easier to apprehend terrorists, may 
have the effect of reducing the likelihood of all attacks.  Immigration rules fall in 
this category and are examples of Model 5 in Table II involving public goods.  
Such rules impact the probability of attacks at numerous locations and  analysis 
should  account  for  this  perhaps  by  focusing  on  the  reduction  of  probabilities 
across all types of attack including particularly high consequence attacks.  An 
additional  complication  is  that  general  rules  may  just  encourage  terrorists  to 
attack our allies rather than the United States.  Benefit-cost analyses typically are 
concerned only with benefits and costs accruing to this country but it should keep 
in mind that for immigration rules, a global benefit-cost analysis would make 
some general security rules appear like specific security rules.  Indeed, one may
argue that the tightened immigration rules issued since 9-11 have played a role in 
the numerous attacks in Europe since 2001.
Other models in Table II lead to similar adaptations of a general benefit-
cost framework including attention to the way in which some investments may, 
for instance, reduce the consequences from multiple types of hazards.
IV. Homeland security regulations and break-even analysis
The discussion in earlier sections  indicated the increasing use by DHS of 
break-even analysis for economically significant security regulations.  None of 
the break-even analyses include issues such as the diversion of attack from one 
site to another, a limited budget, or other issues summarized in Table II.   
The assumptions in DHS’ break-even analysis can be illustrated in more 
detail  with  regard  to  the  cases  identified  in  the  preceding  section.    The  first 
economically significant regulation to use the probability break-even approach 
was the Minimum Driver License/REAL ID (DHS, 2007, p. 127), which requires 
minimum  standards  for  state-issued  identification  documents  such  as  driver’s 
licenses.    The  DHS  structure  approach  assumed  that  there  is  no  change  in 
damages  given  an  event  occurs.    The  analysis  then  proceeds  by  finding  the 
minimum change in probability to make net benefits just equal to zero assuming 
no budget constraint.  This is equivalent to Case 1 of the preceding section.   The 
assumed cost was based on the September 2001 New York terrorist attack.  The 
assumed  consequence  is  an  important  analytical  assumption  for  which  some justification,  based  target  selection  or  distribution  of  consequences  should  be 
carried out.
A second recent analysis concerned the Secure Flight Program regulation 
(DHS, 2007b) which transfers responsibility from the airlines to TSA in order to 
compare passenger flight lists against watch lists and other information.   This 
TSA regulation is to provide essentially real time decisions on passenger access to 
different areas in the airport system.  The analysis was stated as being based on 
LaTourette and Willis (2007) and used a similar consequence scenario as the Real 
ID program, the 2001 attack on New York.  However, the interpretation of the 
analysis is less clear than in the Real ID program.  A break-even frontier was 
developed but  the baseline  measure is  now  stated  as  the  “likelihood of  terror 
attack and loss” (DHS, p. 77).  Material in the text discusses “the reduction in the 
expected  loss”.    These  interpretations  appear  different  than  in  the  Real  ID 
program and point more to a regulation that is both probability and consequence 
reducing, as in Case 3 of the preceding section which implies knowledge of the 
expected value.  Also, The Secure Flight rule is a specific security rule, protecting 
only against attacks using aircraft as weapons.  DHS should have adjusted their 
value of C accordingly.  
A  third  regulation  that  affects  importers  requires  advanced  notice  of 
information about ship-based cargo in order to better perform risk-based targeting 
of inspections.   The key distinction in this analysis (IEc. 2007) is that analysts 
used  three  different  consequences  in  their  analysis  of  a  break-even  change  in 
probability  to  reflect  a  distribution  of  possible  outcomes.    They  evaluated 
alternative  consequence  scenarios  based  on:  1)  a  West  Coast  port  shut-down 
based on a historical event, 2) a nuclear attack at a port or major Eastern U.S. city 
center, and 3) a bioterrorism attack in a major city.  Given the interpretation in the 
text, the regulation appears to be assuming that its purpose is only to change the 
probability of an adverse outcome, and not its consequence, consistent with Case 
1 in the preceding section.
The analyses conducted by DHS are, without question, improvements on 
the  analyses  conducted  prior  to  2007,  which  largely  ignored  benefits  and 
presented  only  implementation  costs.    However,  there  are  numerous  ways  in 
which  these  "break-even"  analyses  remain  incomplete  substitutes  for  a  true 
benefit-cost analysis.  Some incompleteness is due to the implicit assumptions as 
above but also due to further complications, such as the potential displacement of 
attacks from one site to another or the existence of budget limitations.    V. Directions for improvement
Analysis  of  homeland  security  regulations  is  roughly  analogous  to  the 
state of analysis of environmental regulations 25 years ago.  Benefit-cost analysis 
is  now  required  and  conducted  routinely  for  all  significant  environmental 
regulations  and  the  quality  of  the  analysis  has  improved  with  time.    As  one 
analytical challenge is surmounted, new depths are opened for further analysis.  
There  is  no  reason  that  the  analysis  of  homeland  security  regulations  cannot 
evolve in a like manner but it will take sustained effort and a reasonable degree of 
openness on general models.  
Somewhat heuristically, the comparison between risk matrices in Figures 
1 and 2; the investigation of the underlying assumptions in a break-even analysis 
as  summarized  by  the  three  cases,  and  the  extensions  involving  constrained 
expenditures  or  probability  shifting  among  sites  as  summarized  in  Table  II
demonstrate that the analytical steps to a benefit-cost analysis are similar to those 
for  what  are  apparently  simpler  risk  based  methods.    The  challenge  is  to 
understand and evolve the subjective mental maps of probability and consequence 
into a more replicable and data based source of information.  Evolving models in 
both  the  public  domain  such  as  HAZUS  with  its  inventory  of  structures, 
infrastructure,  and  population;  and  those  in  the  private  or  classified  domain 
contain key elements for assessing the benefits of an avoided terrorist attack.  
Benefit-cost analysis should not be seen as something that is inherently 
different than various analyses that are being done, but rather that it seeks to make 
modeling  more  explicit  and  replication  more  likely.    Further,  with  infrequent 
occurrences of some security events (certainly not all), there will always be some 
element of subjectivity or assumed probabilistic structure even in explicit models.  
The  direction  for  improvement  lies  in  the  standard  evolution  of  scientific 
modeling that replaces hidden assumptions with explicit modeling.  
Such  improvements  will  require  commitment  on  the  part  of  both 
government practitioners and academics.  The Office of Management and Budget 
(and  to  a  lesser  degree  Congress)  should  hold  agencies promulgating  security 
regulations to meaningful standards and work with them to improve their analyses 
whether they ultimately appear in the public domain or not.  The authors have 
held various security clearances and viewed analyses that have not been released 
to the public.  The communication of an analysis is a separate issue from its 
development although limits to the communication of modeling efforts will likely 
impede their development, at times justifiably.  
Relevant agencies should respond by hiring the types of interdisciplinary 
teams  (including  economists  as  well  as  security  experts)  that  exist  in  other 
agencies to develop measures of both the cost and benefits of security regulations.  
Some effort has already been made to engage the academic community as well through longer  term  grant  funding and  centers  of  excellence  but  at  this  stage 
wide-spread seed funding may be the most productive to generate a wide set of 
possible approaches.  It should be expected that methods of analysis are likely to 
proceed  as  normally,  gradually  accumulating  information  and  models.  
Discussions of strategy and tactics will not slow in the absence of benefit-cost 
analysis.  The literature is large and growing with new themes regularly emerging.  
Whether  the  evolution  of  benefit-cost  analysis  can  keep  up  with 
increasingly sophisticated text based discussions is a challenge but it is not unique 
to the issue of security.  For instance, text discussions of a precautionary principle 
in  environmental  regulation  have  spurred  the  development  of  more  complex 
models of decision-making uncertainty.  In the context of benefit-cost analysis for 
security, resiliency (Sheffi 2005) may be viewed as greater breadth of multiple 
hazards  being  considered  or  in  the  interconnections  within  and  among 
organizations.    The  benefit-cost  framework  allows  such  concerns  in  concept, 
generally  in  the  identification  of  alternatives  being  considered  and  their 
consequences.   
There appears to be no magic template to immediately implement benefit-
cost analysis of security based regulations that involve impacts, probabilities, and 
valuation.    At  the  same  time,  the  discipline  of  explicitly  modeling  complex 
linkages can be expected to bring new and additional insight to the attention of 
policy makers as it has in other areas.Appendix I. Homeland Security Rules Issued Since 9-11-01. 
A. Rules Included in the OMB Total Cost Estimate 
Rule Title Agency
Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
HHS-FDA 
Registration of Food Facilities under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
HHS-FDA 
Prior Notice of Imported Food under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
HHS-FDA 
Required Advance Electronic Presentation of Cargo Information  DHS-CBP 
Area Maritime Security  DHS-USCG 
Vessel Security  DHS-USCG 
Facility Security  DHS-USCG 
Authority To Collect Biometric Data From Additional Travelers and Expansion 
to the 50 Most Highly Trafficked Land Border Ports of Entry (US-VISIT) 
DHS-BTS 
Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Manifests for Vessels and 
Aircraft 
DHS-CBP 
Air Cargo Security Requirements  DHS-TSA 
Chemical Facility Anti Terrorism Standards DHS-OS
Passenger Manifest for Commercial Aircraft and Vessels Arriving In and 
Departing From the United States
DHS-CBP
Documents Required for Travel Within the Western Hemisphere DHS-CBP
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Implementation in the 
Maritime Sector
DHS-TSA
B. Rules Not Included in the OMB Total Cost Estimate 
Rule Title Agency
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use and Transfer of 
Biological Agents and Toxins 
USDA-
APHIS 
India and Pakistan: Lifting of Sanctions, Removal of Indian and Pakistani Entities, 
and Revision in License Review 
DOC-BIS 
Possession, Use and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins  HHS-
CDC 
Screening of Aliens and Other Designated Individuals Seeking Flight Training  DOJ 
Attorney General's Evaluations of the Designations of Belgium, Italy, Portugal, 
and Uruguay as Participants under the Visa Waiver Program 
DOJ-INS 
Requirements  for Biometric Border Crossing Identifications Cards (BCCs) and 
Elimination of Non-Biometric BCCs on Mexican and Canadian Borders
DOJ-INS 
Authorizing  Collection  of  Fee  Levied  on  F,  J,  and  M  Nonimmigrant 
Classifications under Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act 
DOJ-INS 
Custody Procedures  DOJ-INS 
Review of Custody Determinations  DOJ-INS Rule Title Agency
Requiring  Change  of  Status  from  B  to  F-1  or  M-1  Nonimmigrant  Prior  to 
Pursuing a Course of Study 
DOJ-INS 
Release of Information Regarding INS Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities  DOJ-INS 
Requiring Certification of All Service Approved Schools for Enrollment in the 
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) 
DOJ-INS 
Passenger Data Elements for Visa Waiver Program  DOJ-INS 
Reduced  Course load  for  Certain  F  and  M  Nonimmigrant  Students  in  Border 
Communities 
DOJ-INS 
National Security: Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism  DOJ-BOP 
Protective Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings  DOJ-
EOIR 
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) Rule -- 22 C.F.R. Part 
62, Subpart F 
State 
Aviation Security Infrastructure Fees  DOT-TSA 
Civil Aviation Security Rules  DOT-TSA 
Security Programs for Aircraft With a Maximum Certificated Takeoff Weight of 
12,500 Pounds or More 
DOT-TSA 
Transportation  of  Explosives  from  Canada  to  the  US  Visa  Commercial  Motor 
Vehicle and Railroad Carrier 
DOT-TSA 
Aviation Security: Private Charter Security Rules  DOT-TSA 
Threat  Assessments  Regarding  Citizens  of  the  US  Who  Hold  or  Apply  for  a 
Federal Aviation Administration Certificate 
DOT-TSA 
Aircraft Security under General Operating and Flights Rules  DOT-
FAA 
Flight Crew Compartment Access and Door Designer  DOT-
FAA 
Flight Crew Compartment Access and  DOT-
FAA 
Door Designer 
Enhanced  Security  Procedures  for  Operations  at  Certain  Airports  in  the 
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area 
DOT-
FAA 




Picture Identification Requirements  DOT-
FAA 
Ineligibility for an Airman Certificate Based on Security Grounds  DOT-
FAA 
Limitation on Construction or Alteration in the Vicinity of the Private Residence 
of the President of the United States 
DOT-
FAA 




U.S. Locations Requirement for Dispatching of United States Rail Operation  DOT-FRA 




Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal Consumption under the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
HHS-FDA 
Evidence  Requirement  for  Assignment  of  Social  Security  Administration  SSA Rule Title Agency
Numbers (SSNs) and Assignment of SSNs for Nonwork Purposes 
DNA Sampling of Federal Offenders Under the USA Patriot Act of 2001  DOJ 
Screening of Aliens and Other Designated Individuals Seeking Flight Training  DOT-
FAA 
Retention and Reporting of Information for F, J, and M Nonimmigrants; SEVIS  DOJ-INS 
Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants  DOJ-INS 
Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information  DHS 
Automatic Identification System Carriage Requirements  DHS-
USCG 
Threat  Assessments  Regarding  Alien  Holders  of,  and  Applicants  for,  FAA 
Certificates 
DHS-TSA 
Transportation Worker  Identification  Credential (TWIC) Implementation in the 




Hazmat Fee Rule: Fees for Security Threat Assessments on Hazmat Drivers  DHS-TSA 




Regulations  Implementing  the  Support  Anti-Terrorism  by  Fostering  Effective 
Technologies Act of 2002 
DHS 
Documents  Required  for  Travelers  Departing  From  or  Arriving  in  the  United 
States at Air Ports-of-Entry From Within the Western Hemisphere 
DHS-
BCBP 
Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable to 
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes
DHS-OS
The U.S. Munitions Import  List and Import  Restrictions  Applicable to Certain 
Countries
DOJ-ATF
Letters and Documents; Advanced Electronic Presentation of Cargo Data DHS-
BCBP
Documents Required for Travelers Entering the United States at Sea and Land 
Ports-of-Entry From Within the Western Hemisphere
DHS-
BCBP
Establishing Procedures for Recertification of Schools Approved by the Student 
and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) To Enroll F or M Nonimmigrant Students
DHS-ICE
Long-Range Identification and Tracking of Ships DHS-
USCG
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B. Rules Included in the OMB Total Cost Estimate 
Rule Title Agency
Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
HHS-FDA 
Registration of Food Facilities under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
HHS-FDA 
Prior Notice of Imported Food under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
HHS-FDA 
Required Advance Electronic Presentation of Cargo Information  DHS-CBP 
Area Maritime Security  DHS-USCG 
Vessel Security  DHS-USCG 
Facility Security  DHS-USCG 
Authority To Collect Biometric Data From Additional Travelers and Expansion to the 50 
Most Highly Trafficked Land Border Ports of Entry (US-VISIT) 
DHS-BTS 
Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Manifests for Vessels and Aircraft  DHS-CBP 
Air Cargo Security Requirements  DHS-TSA 
Chemical Facility Anti Terrorism Standards DHS-OS
Passenger Manifest for Commercial Aircraft and Vessels Arriving In and Departing From 
the United States
DHS-CBP
Documents Required for Travel Within the Western Hemisphere DHS-CBP
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Implementation in the Maritime 
Sector
DHS-TSA
C. Rules Not Included in the OMB Total Cost Estimate 
Rule Title Agency
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use and Transfer of 
Biological Agents and Toxins 
USDA-
APHIS 
India and Pakistan: Lifting of Sanctions, Removal of Indian and Pakistani Entities, 
and Revision in License Review 
DOC-BIS 
Possession, Use and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins  HHS-CDC 
Screening of Aliens and Other Designated Individuals Seeking Flight Training  DOJ 
Attorney General's Evaluations of the Designations of Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and 
Uruguay as Participants under the Visa Waiver Program 
DOJ-INS 
Requirements  for  Biometric  Border  Crossing  Identifications  Cards  (BCCs)  and 
Elimination of Non-Biometric BCCs on Mexican and Canadian Borders
DOJ-INS 
Authorizing Collection of Fee Levied on F, J, and M Nonimmigrant Classifications 
under Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
DOJ-INS 
Custody Procedures  DOJ-INS 
Review of Custody Determinations  DOJ-INS 
Requiring Change of Status from B to F-1 or M-1 Nonimmigrant Prior to Pursuing  DOJ-INS Rule Title Agency
a Course of Study 
Release of Information Regarding INS Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities  DOJ-INS 
Requiring  Certification  of  All  Service  Approved  Schools  for  Enrollment  in  the 
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) 
DOJ-INS 
Passenger Data Elements for Visa Waiver Program  DOJ-INS 
Reduced  Course load  for  Certain  F  and  M  Nonimmigrant  Students  in  Border 
Communities 
DOJ-INS 
National Security: Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism  DOJ-BOP 
Protective Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings  DOJ-EOIR 
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) Rule -- 22 C.F.R. Part 
62, Subpart F 
State 
Aviation Security Infrastructure Fees  DOT-TSA 
Civil Aviation Security Rules  DOT-TSA 
Security Programs for Aircraft With a Maximum Certificated Takeoff Weight of 
12,500 Pounds or More 
DOT-TSA 
Transportation  of  Explosives  from  Canada  to  the  US  Visa  Commercial  Motor 
Vehicle and Railroad Carrier 
DOT-TSA 
Aviation Security: Private Charter Security Rules  DOT-TSA 
Threat Assessments Regarding Citizens of the US Who Hold or Apply for a Federal 
Aviation Administration Certificate 
DOT-TSA 
Aircraft Security under General Operating and Flights Rules  DOT-FAA 
Flight Crew Compartment Access and Door Designer  DOT-FAA 
Flight Crew Compartment Access and  DOT-FAA 
Door Designer 
Enhanced  Security  Procedures  for  Operations  at  Certain  Airports  in  the 
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area 
DOT-FAA 
Security Considerations for the Flightdeck on Foreign-Operated transport Category 
Airplanes 
DOT-FAA 
Picture Identification Requirements  DOT-FAA 
Ineligibility for an Airman Certificate Based on Security Grounds  DOT-FAA 
Limitation on Construction or Alteration in the Vicinity of the Private Residence of 
the President of the United States 
DOT-FAA 




U.S. Locations Requirement for Dispatching of United States Rail Operation  DOT-FRA 




Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal Consumption under the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
HHS-FDA 
Evidence Requirement for Assignment of Social Security Administration Numbers 
(SSNs) and Assignment of SSNs for Nonwork Purposes 
SSA 
DNA Sampling of Federal Offenders Under the USA Patriot Act of 2001  DOJ 
Screening of Aliens and Other Designated Individuals Seeking Flight Training  DOT-FAA 
Retention and Reporting of Information for F, J, and M Nonimmigrants; SEVIS  DOJ-INS 
Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants  DOJ-INS 
Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information  DHS 
Automatic Identification System Carriage Requirements  DHS-Rule Title Agency
USCG 
Threat  Assessments  Regarding  Alien  Holders  of,  and  Applicants  for,  FAA 
Certificates 
DHS-TSA 
Transportation  Worker  Identification  Credential  (TWIC)  Implementation  in  the 




Hazmat Fee Rule: Fees for Security Threat Assessments on Hazmat Drivers  DHS-TSA 




Regulations  Implementing  the  Support  Anti-Terrorism  by  Fostering  Effective 
Technologies Act of 2002 
DHS 
Documents Required for Travelers Departing From or Arriving in the United States 
at Air Ports-of-Entry From Within the Western Hemisphere 
DHS-
BCBP 
Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable to 
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes
DHS-OS
The  U.S.  Munitions  Import  List  and  Import  Restrictions  Applicable  to  Certain 
Countries
DOJ-ATF
Letters and Documents; Advanced Electronic Presentation of Cargo Data DHS-
BCBP
Documents  Required  for  Travelers  Entering  the  United  States  at  Sea  and  Land 
Ports-of-Entry From Within the Western Hemisphere
DHS-
BCBP
Establishing Procedures for Recertification of Schools Approved by the Student 
and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) To Enroll F or M Nonimmigrant Students
DHS-ICE
Long-Range Identification and Tracking of Ships DHS-
USCG